Wire Approval Process and Fraud

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As some of you may have heard, there was a recent incident whereby a legitimate invoice was presented for payment via wire, but with fraudulent bank account numbers. The incident was a first for UA, in that it involved the criminal impersonating a regular UA vendor via an alias email and at the same time apparently taking over an email of the UA employee in charge of payment. When the UA preparer sought to confirm via email the bank account numbers with her supervisor, the criminal (who had control of the supervisor's UA email) verified the incorrect numbers. The scale of the deception in the matter was extensive, and it is a clear reminder how vigilant we need to be in our cash disbursement processes. Fortunately, no monies were disbursed, but this was a near miss.

In reviewing controls of the wire process, please note the following:

1. The wire approval process requires handwritten signatures at all levels of the wire approval process (preparer, reviewer, final approver). No electronic signatures such as Docusign are allowed. The final approver is responsible for ensuring this control has been met.

2. Any changes in the vendor's bank account number or bank routing number must be confirmed via phone or face to face with the vendor. Verification must be documented.

3. We will be adding two new check boxes to the wire form: a. yes/no Has the bank account number or routing number changed for this vendor? b. If yes, have the new bank account number and routing number been verbally verified with the vendor?

The attached articles provide important tips that may indicate fraudulent action. I encourage you to read them.

If anyone has questions, please let me know. With appreciation for all you do,

Myron

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2 attachments

- FIN-2016-email fraud.pdf  
  762K
- Procurement wire fraud sept 2016.docx.pdf  
  161K