„Redefined Northern Security – a challenge to Arctic geopolitics?“

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A current state of Arctic geopolitics?
Implementations of security concepts in the Arctic at the early-21st century

- Traditional: nuclear weapon systems, C3I system, military exercises, national security and state sovereignty;
- Energy: an access to oil and gas resources, mass-scale utilization and transportation of fossils, renewable resources;
- Comprehensive: interrelations between security, development, the environ, and international coop;
- Environmental: long-range pollution, nuclear safety, and cleaning-up of wastes by the military;
- Human: climate change (e.g. refugees), food security, human rights, impacts of destructive industries;
- Civic: devolution, empowerment, self-governing.
Special features of Arctic security

• Technology models of classical geopolitics (e.g. nuclear weapon systems);
• Keen interrelationship between the environment and security/the military (e.g. environ degradation);
• Nuclear safety (e.g. nuclear wastes and accidents);
• Interrelationship between indigenous peoples and the military (e.g. conflict of interests in land use);
• Energy security (e.g. access to energy, oil spills);
• Climate change (impacts, uncertainty, tipping point).
The French have declared an end to their nuclear testing and gone home. However, on a tiny atoll in the Pacific, their legacy lives on...
Global security problems in the Arctic

- Military structures for defense, patrolling, guarding, and surveillance, monitoring (e.g. radars, satellites), and for attack (e.g. combat aircrafts, SSNs);
- Military exercises, weapon’s and strategy testing, and military and cold weather training;
- C3I systems including radars, satellites and other surveillance systems (e.g. Thule, US NMD system in Alaska), and reconnaissance aircrafts;
- The nuclear weapon systems of Russia and USA (e.g. old Russian SSBNs under modernization, and most of US attack subs able to operate under the sea ice).
The Soviets have converted a YANKEE-Class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine into a cruise missile attack submarine as the test platform for the large, long-range, nuclear-tipped SS-NX-24 cruise missile. The SS-NX-24 aboard submarines will add yet another dimension to the Soviet strategic threat to the United States in the years ahead.

number of LRINF warheads that existed in 1977 when the SS-20 was first deployed. The SS-20s also have significantly greater range and accuracy and a much shorter reaction time than the missiles they are replacing.

The Soviets have deployed 441 SS-20 launchers at bases west of the Urals and in the Soviet Far East. During 1984, the Soviets began construction of more new bases for the SS-20 than in any other year. Some of this construction was to facilitate the relocation of SS-20 units that had been displaced from their former bases. (These bases are being converted to accommodate the SS-25 mobile ICBM.) In spite of some conversions, real growth was observed in the SS-20 force in 1985.

The mobility of the SS-20 system, unlike the SS-4, allows it to operate under both on- and
Problems related to economy and development

• Instead of scarcity, the ‘curse’ of richness of natural resources;
• Mass-scale utilization of (energy) resources, and transportation of them, by TNCs and SOEs;
• A need of unorthodox thinking, since the rush is much of a power game - there are more options than real utilization!
• Consequently, an Arctic ‘paradox’ = climate change, thinning sea ice, better access to resources, an exponential increase of exploitation and transportation, and finally, the looming global ecological crisis;
• Also food security/safety is in a danger;
...THAT'S ODD, STILL NO INVITATION TO DISCUSS WHO OWNS MY ARCTIC
Global environmental problems in the Arctic region

- Long-range air and water pollution (e.g. high volume of chemicals with POPs characteristics);
- Radioactivity (e.g. nuclear waste, nuclear accidents, stocks of highly enriched uranium/plutonium);
- ‘Bio-invaders’ (e.g. Killer whale);
- Mass-scale utilization of (energy) resources and mass-scale mining (e.g. dumped wastes, leaking pipelines, oil spills);
- Actors of new liberal, global economy with strong business-government relations, TNCs and SOEs.
Climate change

- Climate change with its physical (e.g. melting of sea ice and glaciers, thawing of permafrost, release of methane) and socio-economic impacts (e.g. collapse of infrastructure), and the related ’uncertainty’ (e.g. food security) threatens peoples’ everyday security, even state sovereignty;
- Environmental refugees (as a human right issue);
- This manifests an importance to (re)define people as subjects of security instead of more abstract state as the main subject;
- Climate change, as well as nuclear safety, has caused change(s) in problem definition on security discourses and premises = a ‘new’ northern security;
- Climate change as a discipline for ‘disciplining’ would require a change in problem definition on security paradigm.
Changes in the Northern Security and Arctic Geopolitics - indicators

- Environmental ‘awakening’ and **power transfer** from states to other actors;
- **Regionalism**, self-governing and region-building;
- **Climate change** with direct impacts and uncertainty;
- **Mass-scale utilization** as result of ’Geoeconomics’ / new liberalism, advanced technology, energy security
- **Globalization** and growing **global, economic** interests towards the Arctic;
- Emphasis on **state sovereignty** and national security;
- Dualism of **Regionalism** and **Globalization** (e.g. AY 2013).
Outcomes of the first significant change in Arctic geopolitics

Main themes of the post-Cold War Arctic geopolitics:
1) Increasing circumpolar cooperation by indigenous peoples’ organizations and sub-national governments;
2) Region-building with (nation)states as major actors;
3) New kind of relationship between the (regionalized) circumpolar North, of many actors with different interests, and the outside world.

(Heininen in AHDR 2004)
Policy responses by the Arctic states

- State sovereignty/national security: Five littoral states.
- Comprehensive security: Finland, Iceland, Sweden.
- Economic and business development: All Arctic states.
- Sustainable and regional develop: Most of Arctic states.
- Environ protection and climate: All states, also Russia.
- Safety, rescue and management: All states.
- Human dimension: All states.
- Indigenous peoples rights: Finland, Norway, Russia, Sweden.
- Science/knowledge: KingDen, Finland, Iceland, Norway, USA
- The AC: All states, and most would broaden the mandate.

(Heininen in: The Arctic Yearbook 2012)
Security defined by the Arctic states

- **Canada**: Protecting Canada’s Arctic (maritime) sovereignty;
- **KingDen**: Importance of sovereignty to enhance maritime safety and protect the economic base of Greenland;
- **Finland**: International cooperation and stability as the main means for to increase security - “safety in the wide sense”;
- **Iceland**: Security through international coop and the use of int. treaties;
- **Norway**: Combination of peace building with Russia and “firmly” exercising sovereignty in the ‘High North’;
- **Russia**: Pragmatic domestic policy for the Russian Arctic with the dualism of “military security” and “zone of peace”;
- **Sweden**: “Broad concept of security” and civil instruments.
- **The USA**: Strong emphasis on national security, and “freedom of the seas” (Arctic security concerns play minor role in US defense).
Environmental protection and climate change

• **Similarities:** The need for protecting the environment, esp. marine one, is emphasized by all strategies.

• All states acknowledge and discuss on climate change, but Russia has more reservations on that.

• **Differences:** The term “unique” is used by KingDen and Sweden; “fragile” by KingDen, Finland and Iceland; and “vulnerable” by Norway and Sweden.

• For Finland and Iceland the environment is not a separate sector, but an element of a wider whole, such as security.

• Norway demonstrates “stewardship” of the environment, and KingDen management based on the best scientific knowledge.
Detailed examples

- Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden also mention “environ technology”, and KingDen refers to green technology;
- **Biodiversity**: All, except USA, explicitly express concern on biodiversity; Iceland protection of biota;
- **Contaminants**: POPs are mentioned by Canada, KingDen, Sweden and the USA. Mercury by Canada, KingDEn, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the USA. Radioactivity by Finland, Norway, Sweden and Russia;
- **Food/water security**: Explicitly discussed by Finland, Norway and Sweden, and food security by Canada and KingDem;
- **Legal instruments**: KingDen, Finland and Sweden outline need for to investigate/monitor the existing legal arrangements.
Reflection/response to recent (global) change(s)

- Canada: Yes.
- KingDen: Yes, plus Greenland’s new self-governing status.
- Finland: Yes.
- Iceland: Yes.
- Norway: No, to define the ‘High North’ and coop with Russia.
- Russia: No, a pragmatic means for domestic policy.
- Sweden: No, first of all due to the AC’s chairmanship.
- The USA: Yes.
- The strategies of KingDen and Finland exclusively discuss on a world-wide, global perspective (more general terms).
- None discuss on the humankind, nor redefine the Arctic as one of the ‘Commons’. 
State sovereignty under challenge?

Despite the high political stability and same kind of economic and business interests, state sovereignty (of the Arctic states) is interpreted to be challenged by:

- Indigenous peoples’ and other local actors’ concern on the environ/climate change, and their pressure toward states;
- Growing self-governing and claims by Indigenous peoples;
- Regionalism and power transformation;
- Environmental problems, and climate change;
- Globalization and growing global economic interests (by major non-Arctic Asian and European states, and TNCs and SOEs);
- ‘Political inability’, more than a lack of scientific knowledge or technological poverty, to solve an Arctic ‘paradox’!
Alternative way: to cause a change in problem definition

- Authoritarian solutions are not real ones, since there is “no solution to ecological problems once and for all” - what is needed are solidarity, understanding.

- ‘Ecology’, or ‘climate change’ as global factors which could “promote stability and peace between parties in conflict”.

- An alternative way is to cause a change in problem definition on security discourses, premises and paradigm, and in our entire thinking (of a/the state).

- Consequently, security may become less mystified and controlled by a nation-state/(security) political elite, and citizens would become subjects of security.

- The Arctic as a test, whether ‘industrial civilization’ is capable of slowing down and eventually stopping fossil fuel-based (industrial) development, or not!
Conclusions I

• A state of Northern security and that of Arctic geopolitics can be analysed by using different methods. It is necessary to take ‘Regionalism’ and ‘Globalization’ into consideration and discuss their impacts on further development across the Arctic to understand, and actively shape, regional relations.

• The Arctic region is with high stability and peace, no overtly plagued by conflicts, but influenced by constant change(s).

• An emerging conflict in the Arctic (Ocean) is not likely to happen, although in theory possible. All depends on the criteria by which the Arctic states put their priorities, and do they take into consideration sustainability and world-wide perspective.
Conclusions II

• The Arctic is influenced by multi-functional change(s) with different impacts causing non-military threats and challenges to environmental / human security of the people.

• Arctic states share same economic and business interests as well as the benefit of high stability and cooperation. Five littoral states (‘A5’) share the same interest of state sovereignty/national security.

• Ind. peoples as well as non-state Arctic and also non-Arctic actors share a concern on the environment and climate change, not that of state sovereignty.

• There is a need for a change in problem definition on security discourses, premises and paradigm. Much depends on the criteria by which the Arctic states make their decisions (on security), and shape national policies/international politics.